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During the Civil War not all men served honorably and this was known by everyone in their
communities. We study how shame and ostracism affect behavior by examining whether men who
deserted from the Union Army, and who faced no legal sanctions once the war was over, returned
home or whether they moved and re-invented themselves. We build a unique panel data set that
provides us with a control group for deserters because we can identify men who deserted but then
returned to fight with their companies. We find that, compared to non-deserters and returned
deserters, deserters were more likely to move both out of state and further distances. This effect was
stronger for deserters from pro-war communities. When deserters moved they were more likely to
move to anti-war states than non-deserters. Our study provides a rare test of the empirical
implications of emotion. While both shame and ostracism would push deserters out of their home
community, we find no evidence that deserters faced economic sanctions.
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Fourteen percent of surviving Union Army soldiers had ever deserted during the Civil War, the
bloodiest conﬂict in the nation’s history. Because such a large fraction of men had served in the
army roughly 6 to 11 percent of the Northern male cohorts born between 1835 and 1845 were
deserters.1 How could these men, whose war recordwas known to all in their home communities,
be re-integrated into post-war society when they had been marked as having failed cause and
comrades? Deserters faced the choice of returning home in shame or of moving and re-inventing
themselves. Contemporary accounts are surprisingly silent about their fates.
This paper uses a unique panel data set to uncover Union Army veterans’ community
interactions between enlistment and 1880. If only standard economic push and pull factors inﬂu-
ence migration then we should observe no difference in the migration choices of observationally
identical deserters and non-deserters. But, shame, deﬁned as “the negative emotion experienced
when an actor knows that others are aware that the actor has behaved in a blameworthy fashion”
(Fessler and Haley 2003), would lead deserters to leave home because the “action tendency” of
shame is to hide or disappear (Elster 1998). Public shaming and ostracism, the social exclusion
of an individual, would re-enforce the incentive to exit the home community. The Civil War
provides us witha unique opportunityto study behaviormotivatedby shame. Once the warended
there were no legal sanctions preventing deserters from returning. Because even on the Northern
home front the Civil War was deeply divisive (e.g. Klement 1999), we expect that deserters from
pro-war communities would feel the greatest shame and be least likely to return.
Recent studies have investigated the economic beneﬁts of group loyalty (Berman 2000;
Berman 2003; Levitt and Venkatesh 2000; La Ferrara 2003; Luttmer 2001). In contrast, our work
examines the social and economic costs of disloyalty. We draw on the economics of identity and
1Estimated from the random sample that is the basis of our subsequent analysis.
1of emotion. Identity, a concept common in both the pyschology and sociology literature, has
recently entered economic models (Akerlofand Kranton 2000). In these models identity refers to
a sense of self determinednot just by the actor’s own actions but also by the actions ofother group
members and of their perceptions of him. Emotions such as shame result from a violation of the
group’s norms of behavior. Group members may respond with economic sanctions or with such
non-pecuniary sanctions as ostracism, which will be effective if the violater cares about social
exclusion. While emotions are never directly observable, we argue that our empirical facts are
consistent with the hypothesis that shame and ostracism played a key role in deserters’ migration
decisions. We examine in detail alternative explanations for the patterns we observe.
2 Veterans’ Decisions
The Civil War directly touched all communities. In the Union 65 to 98 percent of the cohorts
born between 1838 and 1845 were examined for military service, and 48 to 81 percent of these
cohorts served, the remainderrejected for poorhealth. The waraffected all social classes within a
community because in this war soldiers were representative of the northernpopulation of military
age in terms of real estate and personal property wealth in 1860 (Fogel 2001) and in terms of
literacy rates (Costa and Kahn 2003a). And in this war local communities had almost complete
information on the daily lives of their men and boys in the military (McPherson 1997). Once the
warwas over the victorioussoldiers returnedhome. Deserters were dishonorablydischarged with
forfeiture of pay and could return home without fear of legal sanctions (Lonn 1928: 202-207;
United States War Department. 1880-1901. Series III, Vol. 5, 1900: 110).2
2Although deserters were ofﬁcially disenfranchised by the United States government, this disenfranchisement
was ineffectual because states regulated votingrequirements (UnitedStates War Department. 1880-1901. Series III,
Vol. 5, 1900: 110). Only Kansas had a law, dating from 1859, specifyingthat a dishonorabledischarge was grounds
for exclusion from voting(Keyssar 2000: 328-390).
2There was no legal reason for the deserters to run away from their home communities
and if the past was forgotten both cowards and heroes should be equally likely to return home.
But, cowards might be ashamed to face the community and the community might ostracize
them. Identity theory, with its emphasis on the importance of self-image and the opinions and
expectatations of one’s reference group, formalizes this intuition (Akerlof and Kranton 2000;
Tajfel 1974; Lynd 1958; Merton 1957). Utility depends upon a person’s identity and identity in
turndependsuponthe degreetowhich aperson’s ownactionsand theactions ofothers correspond
to the reference group’s prescribed behavior. When a member violates the group’s social norms
this affectshis ownidentityand also theidentity ofeveryone withinthat group, leading tofeelings
of shame on the part of the individual and to social scorn and ostracism or public shaming on
the part of the group. While norms are notoriously difﬁcult to measure (Durlauf and Fafchamps
2003), we have a benchmark for community norms, namely their pro-war sentiment. Men from
communities that were strongly in favor of the war, communities which we know produced a
disproportionate share of heroes (Costa and Kahn 2003a), should be less likely to return home if
they deserted. In contrast, men from anti-war communities who deserted may have been just as
likely as non-deserters to return home. In such a setting, not only might deserters from pro-war
communities be more likely to migrate they might also be more likely to change their names to
hide their past.
This paper focuses on how Civil War veterans re-integrated into society after the war.
All faced a locational choice. Should they return to their home communities or move? Consider
ﬁrst the migration decision of deserters and non-deserters once the war is over. Using Akerlof
and Kranton’s (2000) framework, both a deserter and a non-deserter will move if utility in the











































3where C is his consumption, d is an indicator of deserter status, F is a ﬁxed cost to moving, and
I is identity which in turn depends upon desertion status, the actions (a) of community members
(including other soldiers’ desertion status and citizens’ pro- or anti-war actions), and community
prescriptions, P, i.e. how pro-war the community is. In a world of costly information transfer
there will be an asymmetry of information across communities. A coward’s home town may
ostracize and scorn him, and even if it forgave him, he might be too ashamed to face his friends.
But, in a new community a deserter can escape from his past and re-invent himself because the
new town will not know of his war record. In addition, a type of Tiebout sorting can occur such
that deserters seek out more sympathetic (anti-war) communities. A non-deserter’s migration
decision has the familiar economic push and pull factors.3 But, the non-deserter will face no
shame. Shame can therefore be thought of as either a cost to deserters to staying in the home
community or as affecting deserters’ expectations of future life in the community (Elster 1998).
A coward who feels no shame may still face community ostracism and this creates an
incentive to migrate away. Although choosing heroism or cowardice during the war is a one-shot
game, making strategic sanctioning ineffective, sanctioning could still be motivated by revenge,
by a sense that deserters had not done their fairshare, or by the sense that deserters had personally
harmed men who served honorably or the cause they had sacriﬁced for (Kandel and Lazear 1992;
Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Levine 1998; Rabin 1993).4 Even if deserters felt no connection to their
home communities and therefore no shame (the identity part of the utility function drops out),
their consumption would be lower in a community that imposed economic sanctions. A pro-war
3He may also Tiebout sort because a non-deserter who started life in an anti-war county might feel mismatched.
In states where soldier and sailor votes were tabulated separately, McClellan received 45 percent of the civilianvote,
but only 22 percent of the military vote in the 1864 presidential election (calculated from Long 1994: 285).
4Dynastic linkage could induce compliance even in short-term interactions. In developing countries today in an
overlapping generation settingpotentialpunishment of children leads to good behavior of the current generation (La
Ferrara 2003). In our setting there is nothingthat children of deserters can do to “atone” for their father’s actions.
4community would be more likely to impose such sanctions. A pro-war community would also
be more likely to impose non-pecuniary sanctions and these would be effective as long as the
deserter identiﬁed with the home community, in which case he would feel shame. While we will
not be able to explicitly distinguish between shame and ostracism, we will be able to distinguish
between shame and ostracism and economic sanctions.
The desertion and migration choice are sequential, separated by several years, but the
expectation of shame and ostracism can bind them into one decision. Consider the case of a
rational forward looking soldier who is deciding whether or not to desert.5 If this soldier believes
that by deserting he will not be able to return home because of the shame and ostracism, he
may never desert at all. While we acknowledge the possibility that the migration and desertion
decision are bundled we discount this.
A more realistic scenario is that soldiers myopically base their desertion decision on
ideology, their risk of death, and on social capital within their ﬁghting units.6 A reduced form










where a soldier deserts if D > 0. Those highly committed to the cause (HC) are less likely to
desert, but even highly committed men will desert if social capital within their company (SC) is
low enough and if the horrors of war that the company is exposed to are high enough. Soldiers
5There is a similarity between this decision and the decision to go on welfare. A forward looking agent would
realize the short run beneﬁts and the possible long-run stigma costs of going on welfare. Bertrand et al. 2000 ﬁnd
evidence for social network effects on welfare take-up rates and also on marriage and fertility, but cannot determine
whether the mechanism is informationor culture.
6The decision was unlikely to be based upon penalties for desertion. Executions of deserters were rare. Out of
roughly 200,000 men who deserted from the Union Army, 80,000 were caught and returned to the army and 147
were executed for desertion (Linderman 1987: 174, 176). In our random sample of Union Army soldiers roughly15
percent of men died while in the army either from wounds or disease.
5could also succumb to extreme fear (which can be thought of as temporarily lowering their
discount factor or raising their perceived probability of death), as embodied in the identically
independently distributed error term, U. Equation 2 highlights three sets of possible instrumental
variables that we discuss later in greater detail – company proxies for war exposure and proxies
for company social capital and own ideology.
Figure 1 illustrates the sequential decision. A soldier can either desert or not desert.
If he deserts he can either remain a deserter or he can return to ﬁght again, either willingly or
under duress.7 We expect that there would be much less shame in being a returned deserter than
in being a deserter because returned deserters returned to ﬁght until the end of the war. We
observe these decisions for everyone in the sample. Once the war is over a soldier can either
move or remain in the home community. Forward looking men who forsaw future ostracism in
their community might adopt an “option value” approach of deserting and then returning home
and seeing how they were treated in their communities.8 Because soldiers had never had the
experience of deserting and then returning to their home communities, they could not predict the
consequences of their action. As this uncertainty was resolved, they could then migrate based
upon Equation 1. Soldiers who move then pick a new community. We observe these migration
decisions for the individuals we are able to link to the 1880 census, a census which provides us
with locational and occupational informationon veterans when their expected median age was 41
7Roughly 25 percent of returned deserters surrendered voluntarily, including those under presidential amnesty
proclamations. The remainder were arrested (Lonn 1928: 179).
8Ofﬁcial war records supportour sequential framework. Lonn (1928: 198-208)reports that duringthe war bands
of deserters from both sides would roam the territory in or adjacent to the Confederacy where ﬁghting had taken
place and that northern deserters were also particularlylikely to be found in Canada, the Territory of Wyoming, and
the mountainous,wooded, and sparsely settledregions ofPennsylvania. Very few deserters went tothe Confederacy.
Prior to late 1863, before the federal government actively pursued deserters, deserters would also simply go home.
After 1863, deserters ﬂed their home communities for less populated areas. Once the war was over local ofﬁcials
complained that their communities were overrun with deserters who had returned home (Lonn 1928: 198-208). We
acknowledgethepossibilitythata deserter may bemore likelytoavoiddetectioninan anti-warhome communityand
thus that self-interest, independent of identity,wouldpush a soldierto such a community. However, as we discuss in
the Results section, we ﬁnd no evidence for this.
6and thus when most of their life-cycle migration was complete.
3 Empirical Framework
While emotionand identityare never directlyobserved, the social interactions triggeredby shame
and ostracism can be detected through estimation of discrete choice models. One prediction is
that, conditional on being found, deserters are more likely to leave home, particularly if they are












































































where m is an indicator variable equal to one if the soldier moved, RD is a dummy variable equal
to one if the soldier was a returned deserter (one who later returned to ﬁght) and D is a dummy
variable equal to one if the soldier was a deserter (non-deserter is the omitted category),
P
h is a
measure of the home community’s pro-waridentity, and X is a vector of individualcharacteristics





D should be greater than zero. (Since
we will be using a measure of anti-war sentiment the coefﬁcient on our interaction term will have
a negative sign.)
A comparison of migration propensities for deserters and non-deserters may not yield
a valid test for the impact of shame because desertion status is not randomly assigned. While
desertion could cause migration, it could also proxy for other attributes. Deserters may be highly
mobile people who cannot commit to either the military or to a speciﬁc community. In terms of
observable characteristics deserters were more likely to be married, to be foreign-born, to have
low wealth, and to be illiterate (Costa and Kahn 2003a). Thus differences in human capital are
7an alternative explanation for differential migration rates.
We have two approaches for recovering the causal effect of desertion on mobility. We
use returned deserters as a control group for deserters in the above equations. While returned
deserters resemble deserters along key observable characteristics such as wealth and illiteracy
rates, they returned to ﬁght and were honorably discharged. We also have a plausible set of
instruments for deserter status in measures of company speciﬁc likelihood of death or injury
(under the assumption that either war horror and post-war shell shock are not related or that
war horror does not affect post-war migration), in measures of company speciﬁc social capital,
and in measures of ideological committment (see Equation 2). While companies were drawn
locally, company characteristics are not highly correlated with county characteristics (county
heterogeneity can explain only about 3 to 9 percent of the variance in company heterogeneity)
and county characteristics did not predict desertion. Companies consisted of roughly 100 men
and desertion rates were lower in more homogeneous companies suggesting that social capital
in companies reduced shirking. In addition, desertion rates were higher when death rates were



























ideological committment, and company characteristics. These allow us to recover the treatment
effect of being a deserter as distinct from an un-instrumented probit where deserter status may
reﬂect both treatment and selection effects. We investigate differentsets of instrumentalvariables
out of concern that our measures of ideological committment and company characteristics may
capture community characteristics. If desertion proxies for an unobservable tendency toward
high mobility then the coefﬁcient on desertion in the instrumental variables regression should be
8smaller than in the simple probit speciﬁcation. Alternatively, the instrumental variable results
mayyieldalargerestimatedcoefﬁcientondeserterstatusthanin theordinaryprobit. Supposethat
there is a set of soldiers who greatly enjoy living in their pro-war community or whose families
are prominent in the community. The anticipation of shame, including that directed against the
entire family, increases the probability that they will not desert in the ﬁrst place. In this case, our
set of deserters is less likely to include men from the most pro-war communities. The ordinary
probit would therefore underestimate whether a random soldier assigned “deserter” status would
move away.
Shame and ostracism also predict that deserters might be more likely to change their
names and re-invent themselves, again particuly if they are from a pro-war community. We























































































where f is an indicator equal to one if we found the soldier and U is an indicator equal to one if
the soldier had an uncommon name. Our ﬁnding equations convey both informationabout who is
likely to hide from the past and they allow us to re-estimate the probability of a move, controlling
for selection (the correlation between our ﬁnding equation and our moving equation).
Where do migrants go? Deserters may seek out sympathetic communities controlling
for such state characteristics as distance moved. We estimate the effect of pull factors on the
locational decisions of movers as a function of deserter status using conditional logit models.9
9We do not estimate a nested logitmodel in which the decision is ﬁrst whether to stay or to move to another state
and then, for movers, the decision is what state to move to, because the inclusive value would barely differ among
men. For example, it would be the same for any two men who enlisted in the same state.
9We use our conditional logit models to determine if returned deserters have the same preferences
as deserters or non-deserters. We run two different speciﬁcation, one in which we interact
the characteristics of the potential destinations with a dummy for returned deserter (excluding






























































































where s is the potential state the soldier could move to, i indexes the individual, j indexes the
state,
P
j measures how pro-war the state was,
X
j is a vector of other state characteristics, D is
a dummy equal to one if the individual was a deserter, and RD is a dummy equal to one if the
individual was a returned deserter.
While both shame and ostracism and sanctions yield similar migration predictions, we
can test whether communities imposed economic sanctions on deserters. If communities impose
economic sanctions on deserters then we expect that there will be a monetary penalty to being
a deserter. We test this by examining the occupational transitions of non-deserters, returned
deserters, and deserters.
4 Data
Our data are based upon the military service records of enlisted Union Army soldiers linked
backwards to the 1860 census.10 The military service records provide information on age at
10Thefullsetofmilitaryservicerecordsandofthe1860censusrecordsare availablefromtheCenterforPopulation
Economics, http://www.cpe.uchicago.edu, and were compiled by a team of researchers led by Robert Fogel.
10enlistment, year of enlistment, place of enlistment and also all military service events such
as death, injury, illness, desertion, arrest, AWOL, and discharge. The census records provide
information on wealth and illiteracy and allow us to infer marital status in 1860. As detailed in
the Appendix, our sample is based upon 20,301 men, known to have survived the war, known not
to be dead by 1880, and with full informationon military service dates and on basic demographic
characteristics. We searched for these men in the 1880 census using only name, place of birth,
and expected age in 1880 and found 7,224 (36 percent) of them.11 Compared to our initial sample
these 7,224 men were more likely to be native-born, were from richer households, and were less
likely to be from the rapidly growing urban counties. Because we do not know if the individuals
we were searching for were still alive, we cannot determine whether our sample differences are
due to mortality attrition or to the meticulousness of the census enumerators or the respondents.
However, in both samples, we have the full range of socioeconomic and demographic variation.
We restrict our sample to men for whom we can identify county of enlistment, leaving
us with a sample of 18,820 men, 6,549 of whom are linked to the 1880 census with an idenﬁable
1880county. Furtherrestrictingthesampletomenwithmorecompleteinformationonobservable
characteristics leaves us with 18,274 men, 6,479 of whom are linked to the 1880 census. We
examine both moves across states and moves of at least 350km (a distance larger than the median
within state cross-county move but smaller than the median state move) to control for differences
in state sizes. However, we preferto focus on state moves because we can then examine how state
characteristics affect where migrants go. We classify all men as either non-deserters, returned
deserters, or deserters. Table 1 lists by deserter status the variableswe created describing recruits’
individual characteristics and some of their home community characteristics. In addition to these
variableswealsocreatedstateﬁxedeffects,dummiesformissingindividualinformation,variables
11Ourﬁndingrate compares favorablywithlinkagerates done withsamples thatare notinmachine-readable form.
For example, in linkingfrom the 1850 to 1860 censuses, Ferrie (1996) had a ﬁnding rate of 9 percent.
11describing company characteristics (which we use as instrumental variables for deserter), and
variables describing the characteristics of the states that were potential destinations for veterans.
(See the Data Appendix for details.)
Table 1 shows that, compared to non-deserters, deserters were poorer, were more likely
to be foreign-born,particularlyIrish, were less likely to be farmers and more likelyto be laborers,
were less likely to be volunteers, were more likely to be married, were more likely to be illiterate,
were less likely to have enlisted early, and were more likely to be from a large town. Returned
deserters resembled non-deserters in terms of birth place and volunteer status and they resembled
deserters in terms of wealth, illiteracy, marital status, and size of city of residence. Returned
deserters were less likely to be farmers than non-deserters but more likely to be farmers than
deserters.
Recall that we predicted that deserters from anti-war communities would be less likely
to leave home than deserters from pro-war communities (see Equation 4). As our measure
of how anti-war a community was, we use the share of the vote for McClellan in the 1864
presidential election. The 1864 Democratic platform was one of peace without victory, resolving
that “immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities” (Long 1994: 283). Secret societies
whichactively helpednorthernsoldiers desert, whichdiscouragedenlistments, andwhich resisted
thedraftwereactiveinsuch Democraticstrongholdsas theeast northcentralregion(Waugh1997:
211). While a vote for McClellan was a vote against war, an ideological vote, and a vote for
economic self-interest (see the Voting Appendix), we will later argue that the interaction term
between McClellan’s share of the vote and deserter status primarily reﬂects anti-war sentiment.
125 Results: Migration
Deserters were more likely to move across states between enlistment and 1880 than non-deserters
or returned deserters. (see Table 2). Sixty-four percent of deserters moved across states whereas
only 44 percent of non-deserters and 42 percent of returned deserters moved across states.12
Deserters were also more likely to move further away than non-deserters or returned deserters
(see Figure 2), but deserters who stayed within state were less likely to move across counties (see
Table 2), suggesting that deserters substituted distant moves for close moves. Note that returned
deserters and non-deserters had almost identical migration propensities. Moving probabilities
differedby the percentage of the vote in the home county forMcClellan (see Table 3). In counties
where McClellan received less than 40 percent of the vote, 68 percent of deserters moved across
state compared to 47 percent of non-deserters. But in counties where McClellan received more
than 60 percent of the vote, 58 percent of deserters moved across state compared to 52 percent of
non-deserters. We also observe such differences for the probability of moving at least 350km.
Table 4 shows the calculated differences in the moving propensities of non-deserters,
returned deserters, and deserters by the percentage of the vote cast for McClellan in the 1860
home county. Being in a county where McClellan received less than 40 percent of the vote
increases deserters’ probability of moving across states by 0.16 relative to non-deserters and by
0.08 relative to returned deserters. Deserters’ probability of moving at least 350km increases by
0.13 relative to non-deserters and by 0.14 relative to returned deserters. When deserters did move
the state that they moved to was more pro-McClellan than the state non-deserters moved to and
it was also more distant in terms of miles and in terms of latitude (not shown).
As shown in Table 1, non-deserters, returned deserters, and deserters differed in terms
12This was a period of high migration rates. In a random sample of men who enlisted in the Union Army we ﬁnd
that 44 percent of the native-born moved between their state of birth and their state of enlistment.
13of observable characteristics. We therefore estimate migration models controlling for these
differences. Table 5, which presents the results from our probit regressions of the probability
of moving on deserter status (Equations 3 and 4), shows that deserters’ probability of moving
across states was higher by a statistically signiﬁcant 0.135 compared to both non-deserters and
returned deserters. We ﬁnd the comparison of deserters with returned deserters quite compelling.
Deserters’ probabilityof moving at least 350kmwas higherby 0.115.13 A tobitmodel shows that,
controllingforallothercharacteristics, moverswhoweredesertersmoved 172.367km(ˆ
 =52.439)
compared to non-deserters whereas movers who were returned deserters moved only 1.482km
(ˆ
 =56.028) compared to non-deserters. When we interact deserter with the logarithm of the
percent of the county vote cast for McClellan we ﬁnd that a standard deviation increase in the
percentage ofthe vote cast forMcClellan wouldlower thestate migrationprobabilityofa deserter
by0.053. Althoughtheinteractionbetweendeserterandthepercentofthevotecast forMcClellan
is only a marginally statistically signiﬁcant predictor of moves of at least 350km, the interaction
term and deserter status are highly jointly statistically signiﬁcant.14 When we restrict the sample
to men for whom we had a higher quality link to the 1880 census, we ﬁnd that the magnitude
of the coefﬁcients is similar, but the standard error is much larger because of the considerable
reduction in sample size.
Deserter status may be correlated with unobserved factors that inﬂuence migration (see
Equation 2). We therefore instrument for deserter status using 1) such indicators of war horror
as the overall company death rate, the company death rate from disease, the company death rate
at speciﬁc times, and dummy indicators of battles and 2) our indicators of war horror plus such
13We obtain coefﬁcients of similar magnitude when we run linear probability models with county ﬁxed effects,




14company characteristics as birth place fragmentation, occupational fragmentation, the fraction of
a company of a speciﬁc occupation, and the company Gini coefﬁcient for 1860 personal property
wealth, and ideological characteristics such as the percent of the vote received by Lincoln in the
1860 election in the recruit’s county of enlistment (see the footnote to Table 6 for the full set of
instrumental variables). Our identifying assumption is that war horror, company social capital,
and ideology in 1860 affect desertion but not migration. While war horror which leads to shell
shock could affect the migrationdecision, we ﬁndno evidence that it does. In morehomogeneous
companies desertion rates were lower and when company death rates were high desertion rates
were higher too (Costa and Kahn 2003a). Recall that county heterogeneity can explain only
3 to 9 percent of the variance in company heterogeneity and that companies no longer existed
after the war. Table 6 compares probit and IV probit marginals derived from Equation 5 using
non-desertersas acontrolgroupforthecombinedcategoryofdeserters andreturneddeserters(our
instrumental variables predict whether a soldier deserted, but not whether he returned to ﬁght).
Because our instruments are weak, with a ﬁrst stage pseudo
R2 below 0.1, we prefer the simple
probit estimates (Bollen, Guilkey, and Mroz 1995) and view our instrumental variables estimates
mainly as a test of the direction of the bias in using a standard probit.15 The IV marginals on
deserter are bigger than the probit marginals in all cases. Consider the case of moves across state
and of moves of at least 350km without controls for county characteristics. In the simple probits
the coefﬁcients on deserter status are 0.10 and 0.09, respectively. When we instrument using
our war horror instruments alone the coefﬁcients increase to 0.40 and 0.31, respectively. Using





 169) for state moves but cannot reject the hypothesis that desertion status is
15When we regress desertion status on our war horror instruments alone the pseudo
R2 is 0.05 and when we use
the full set of insturements the pseudo
R2 is 0.07. We began with a larger set of instruments but excluded some of
them as invalid.




 846). When we use the full set of instruments
we can reject the hypothesis that our instruments are invalid for state moves in which we control
for county heterogeneity, a proxy for community social capital (Costa and Kahn 2003b), but
we cannot reject the hypothesis for our other speciﬁcations.16 Note, however, that none of our
coefﬁcients shrink, suggesting that our simple probit results probably underestimate the effect of
deserter status on the probability of migration.
Wearelesslikelytoﬁnddeserterscomparedbothtonon-desertersandreturneddeserters,
suggesting thatdeserters mayhave soughtto hidetheirpast bychangingtheirnames (see Table 7).
Running the regression speciﬁed in Equation 6 show that compared to non-deserters, a deserter’s
probability of being found is lower by 0.095. Compared to a returned deserter, a deserter’s
probabilityofbeing foundis lowerby 0.057. When we interactdeserter status with the proportion
of the vote for McClellan (see Equation 7) we ﬁnd that when we control forcounty characteristics
(or alternatively when we used county ﬁxed effects in a linear probability model), deserters from
counties where McClellan received a larger share of the vote are more likely to be found, but
the effect is small and statistically insigniﬁcant. However, deserter status and the interaction of
deserter status with McClellan’s proportion of the vote is jointly statistically signiﬁcant.
Ourresultsarerobusttocontrollingforselection. Apotentialconcernisthatwecanonly
measure migration for those we can ﬁnd. Our ﬁnding equation allows us to re-estimate our probit
Equations 3 and 4 controlling for selection using a dummy indicator for uncommon name as the
exclusion restriction. Table 8 shows that the selection correction slightly increases the magnitude
of the coefﬁcient on deserter and on the interaction between deserter and the percentage of the
county voting for McClellan. Returned deserters remained indistinguishable from non-deserters.
16Whenwe includecompany characteristics andideologyas exogeneousregressors intheIVprobitand testforthe
jointsigniﬁcance of these potentialinstruments we obtaina
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10 of 15.81, implyingthat we can reject the hypothesis
that our instruments are invalid at the 10 percent level.
16When we do not interact deserter with the percentage of the county vote for McClellan we ﬁnd
thatadeserter’s probabilityofmovingacross stateis 0.142comparedtoanon-deserterandthathis
probability of moving at least 350km is 0.116 compared to a non-deserter. A standard deviation
increase in the percentage of county vote for McClellan raised a deserter’s probability of a state
move by 0.054.
Whendesertersdidmovetheysoughtoutastatethatwasmorepro-McClellancompared
to those picked by non-deserters or returned deserters. Table 9, which presents estimates of
Equations 8 and 9, shows that controlling for distance from state of enlistment as measured in
miles and in minutes from the enlistment state’s latitude, the odds that a deserter would move
to a state were higher the greater that state’s share of the vote for McClellan. A deserter was
also more likely to pick a state of a different latitude, because fewer deserters were farmers and
thereforedid not have skills that were best used along the same latitude.17 When we restricted the
sample to men who were farmers at enlistment we found no difference in the latitude attributes
of the states picked by deserters and non-deserters. However, deserters continued to pick more
pro-McClellan states. When we examined locational choices by region we found that deserters
were not more likely to go to the states of the former Confederacy, but they were more likely
to move to a middle atlantic or east north central state. In contrast, compared to non-deserters
returned deserters were no more likely to pick a pro-McClellan state.
We ﬁnd some evidence that deserters from large cities were less likely to move, perhaps
because of the anonymity provided by large cities. When we interact deserter status with a
dummy variable that is equal to one if the deserter enlisted in a city whose population was





could grow the same crops along the same latitude.
17term between deserter and our city dummy is -0.111 (ˆ
 
￿ 0.069), which barely misses being
signiﬁcantly different from 0 at the 10 percent level. However, the coefﬁcients on deserter and on
the interaction term are jointly signiﬁcantly different from 0 (
 2
￿29.88). In our long distance
regression we ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient on deserter was 0.136 (ˆ
 
￿0.042) and that the coefﬁcient
on the interaction term is -0.076 (ˆ
 
￿0.080), which while insigniﬁcant is suggestive in terms of
magnitude. Both coefﬁcients are jointly signiﬁcantly different from 0 (
 2
￿31.71). We suspect
that our sample size is too small to precisely identify a city size effect.
6 Shame or Economic Sanctions?
Both shame and economic sanctions predict that deserters from strongly pro-war communities
should leave home. But, only economic sanctions make strong predictions concerning the
economic outcomes of deserters. Fortunately, the 1880 Census offers a few clues for testing
the extent of economic sanctions through studying the occupational dynamics of deserters and
non-deserters. A successful economic boycott of deserters might lead them to fall down the
occupational ladder.
Did deserters face a monetary penalty? We ﬁnd no evidence that they did. Conditional
on being a farmer, an artisan, or a laborer upon enlistment
 2 tests indicate that the occupational
transitions of non-deserters, returned deserters, and deserters between enlistment and 1880 were
the same (see Table 10). Either communities did not impose economic sanctions on deserters or
by moving to a pro-McClellan state deserters avoided economic penalties. However, among the
small group of men who were professionals or proprietors at enlistment deserters were less likely
to remain professionals or proprietors and were more likely to become artisans and less likely
to become farmers. The data also suggest that the occupational transitions of returned deserters
resemble those of deserters, but relative to deserters fewer returned deserters were laborers and
18more of them remained professionals or proprietors. When we examined the data by state mover
status we found that only for state movers did the 1880 occupational distribution of former
professionals or proprietors differ between deserters and non-deserters, suggesting that a move
motivatedby shame may have differentiallyhurtprofessionals orproprietorsbecause theirhuman
and social capital may not have been as easily transferable across states.
We ﬁnd no evidence that strongly pro-war communities imposed economic sanctions
upon the deserters who did stay. When we examine men who did not move across state and
who were from counties where McClellan received less than 40 percent of the vote, then, condi-
tional upon occupational class at enlistment, the occupational distributions of non-deserters and
deserters were statistically indistinguishable. Although evidence from the select group of men
who remained in the home state can only be suggestive, it is consistent with the hypothesis that
personal shame may have played a larger role than explicit community ostracism in the migration
decision. Professionals and proprietorsare most likely to have been hurt by social exclusion even
with no economic sanctions, but we ﬁnd no evidence that deserters who were professionals and
proprietors were affected. We also do not ﬁnd any evidence that social exclusion extended to
marriagemarkets– there were no differencesin maritalstatus in 1880 between deserters, returned
deserters, and non-deserters.
Men whoremainedintheirhomecommunitiesmayhavebeen moreeagertoregaintheir
honor. Long after the war was over and the Union Army pension system was ﬁrmly entrenched,
many soldiers sought to expunge the charge of desertion from their records. In 1889 Congress
stipulated that desertion charges could be expunged if the deserter had been absent because of
illness or injury contracted in the line of duty and in subsequent Congresses thousands of private
bills were introduced to correct a speciﬁc soldier’s record and consider him honorably discharged
(Lonn 1928: 215-218). Deserters thus became eligible for pensions. When we restricted the
sample to deserters and examined who ever applied for a pension we found that those who had
19not moved across state were statistically signiﬁcantly more likely to apply for a pension. Those
who had not moved across county were more likely to apply for a pension, but the effect was not
statistically signiﬁcant. Our results suggest either that those who did not leave home were more
eager to correct their records or that they had extenuating circumstances for deserting.
7 Alternatives for the Emotion Hypothesis
Must such emotions as shame and ostracism be introduced to explain our facts? Could more
conventional models of migration focusing on consumption opportunities, crime and punishment
models of war-time detection of deserters, or unobserved heterogeneity rationalize our ﬁndings?
Deserters might simply be highly mobile people. We tested for this by restricting the sample to
the native-born and controlled for whether the veterans had migrated between state of birth and
state of enlistment (a proxy for mobility), we found that, compared to non-deserters, deserters’
probabilityofmigratingoutof state was 0.111 (ˆ
 
￿0.034)and that returneddeserters’probability
of migrating out of state was -0.019 (ˆ
 
￿0.041), coefﬁcients virtually identical to those obtained
without controlling for our mobility proxy. Deserters’ greater mobility could not be explained by
their better health capital. When we controlled for whether or not the soldier was wounded or for
length of time served, our coefﬁcients remained virtually unchanged. Also recall that deserters
and returned deserters behaved differently and when we instrument for desertion status the effect
of desertion on migration becomes much larger. We also ﬁnd that men who arguably had the
same “bad” unobservable characteristics as both deserters and returned deserters, namely those
who had committed various disciplinary infractions in the Army, such as being absent without
leave or an unrelated offense leading to their arrest, looked like non-deserters in terms of their
mobility patterns.
Deserters’ greatermobilitydoes not reﬂectconditionsinthe states or countiesthey were
20from. All of our regressions included state ﬁxed effects. We also ran linear probability models in
which we included county ﬁxed effects. Deserters’ probability of migrating out of state relative
to non-deserters rose to 0.163 (ˆ
 
￿0.028). When we included an interaction term between the
logarithm of the percentage voting for McClellan and deserter status the coefﬁcient on deserter
status rose to 0.553 (ˆ
 
￿0.220) and the coefﬁcienton the interactionterm was -0.102 (ˆ
 
￿0.057).
Deserters’ probability of moving does not reﬂect the characteristics of their companies either.
When we ran linear probability models that included company ﬁxed effects we found that in the
state mover speciﬁcation with no interactions the coefﬁcient on deserter was 0.140 (ˆ
 
￿0.031).
When we included an interaction term of deserter with the logarithm of the percentage voting for
McClellan we found that the coefﬁcient on deserter was 0.496 (ˆ
 
￿0.134) and that the coefﬁcient
on the interaction term was -0.093 (ˆ
 
￿0.036).
Deserters’ locational choice in 1880 may reﬂect efforts to avoid detection during the
war. Duringthewararationaldesertermightseek outsafehavenswithalowdetectionprobability.
If citizens in areas where McClellan received a high proportionof the vote successfully aided and
abetted deserters then deserters might move to such areas, particularly if these were their home
communities, and remain thereuntil we sample them in 1880. We can test whetherdetection rates
were lower in counties where McClellan received a high proportion of the vote by restricting our
sample to deserters and returned deserters and running a probit in which the dependent variable
is a dummy equal to one if the soldier was a returned deserter and in which we control for the
logarithm of McClellan’s share of the vote, individual characteristics, and for region.18 Because
roughly 75 percent of returned deserters were arrested, if the coefﬁcient on the proportion of
the vote for McClellan is negative and statistically signiﬁcant then this suggests that detection
18Relative to deserters returned deserters were less likelyto be foreign-bornand were more likelyto have enlisted
in the ﬁrst year. Those who deserted early should be at greater risk of being caught. If foreign-born deserters were
more likely to leave the country than native-born deserters we will underestimate the effect of deserter status on
migration.
21rates were lower in pro-McClellan counties. However, we ﬁnd that this coefﬁcient is small and
statistically insigniﬁcant. When we exclude region ﬁxed effects we ﬁnd that it is larger, but
positive.
Deserters’ moving to pro-McClellan states may reﬂect economic opportunity, not ide-
ology. We reject this for two reasons. First, pro-McClellan counties had a smaller proportion of
the labor force in manufacturing, a sector that began to boom after the Civil War, and had less
valuable farm land (see Table 1 in the Appendix). Second, if economic opportunity were the
main motivator non-deserters should be moving there as well. While deserters were less likely to
be farmers than non-deserters and therefore faced different labor market demand, we found that
among both farmersand non-farmersdeserters were more likelyto move to a pro-McClellan state
than non-deserters.
We also tested whether a vote for McClellan was a vote against war, an ideological
vote, or a vote for economic self-interest by using 1860 voting. Voters in 1860 could not have
predicted war and the economic and ideological coalitions voting for Lincoln in 1860 were the
same coalitions votingfor Lincolnin 1864. When we ranEquation 3 controllingforthe logarithm
of the share of the vote received by Lincoln in 1860, our coefﬁcient on deserter status did not
change. When we ran Equation 4 controllingfor the share of the vote received by Lincoln in 1860
and an interaction term between Lincoln’s share of the vote and deserter status, the interaction
term was insigniﬁcant but our coefﬁcients on deserter status and on the interaction between
McClellan’s share of the vote and deserter status remained unchanged.
8 Conclusion
Although the Civil War ended in 1865, memories of the war left their marks on all communities
and on all veterans. Northern communities began to observe Decoration Day with ceremonies
22honoringthe patrioticdead. Unionveterans wereviewed by themselves and by Northerncivilians
as the country’s saviors who had “preserved for humanity the Republican form of government”
and “elevated the country to a high dignity” (General Daniel Sickles, quoted in McConnell
1992). Their deeds were commemorated in magazines and newspapers, in generals’ best-selling
memoirs, in regimental histories, in songs, and in public monuments. Union veterans satisﬁed
Victorian ideals of manhood and self-control and the classical republican ideal of a virtuous
citizenry willing to sacriﬁce for self-government. They were also God’s chosen instruments for
saving the Union and sweeping away the curse of slavery, permitting the inauguration of a new
era (Clarke 2002). Such a culture could only exacerbate deserters’ personal feelings of shame.
Our study is one of the few empirical investigations of the effects of emotion on
economic decisions. Diaries, letters, and newspaper accounts from the antebellum era have not
left a paper trail of how deserters fared after the war. Our unique panel data set allowed us to
discover that faced with the choice of returning home or of moving and re-inventing themselves,
deserters moved. Compared to a non-deserter, a deserter’s probability of leaving his state by
1880 was higher by at least 0.135 and his probability of moving at least 350km was higher by
0.115. Deserters from pro-war communities were more likely to move than deserters from anti-
war communities and when deserters moved they were more likely to move to anti-war states.
Perhaps it is no accident that the fate of deserters is not mentioned in contemporary accounts.
As we observe in countries making a transition to democratic rule, there is a desire to avoid
painful confrontations after traumatic national events, particularly if a sizable proportion of the
population behaved shamefully (Barahona de Brito et al. 2001; Paxton 1998). National myths
maypersist fora longtime. Lonn’s (1928)study ofdesertioninthe CivilWarpointedout that“the
knowledge of any desertion in the brave ranks of the armies ... will come as a distinct shock” and
that “the average reader will question the worth-whileness of an exhaustive study of that which
seems to record a nation’s shame” (p. v).
23The pervasiveness ofreports of shame across differentcultures has led scholars to argue
that shame is partially crafted by natural selection to ensure conformation to the social norms
that are necessary for cooperation (e.g. Fessler and Haley 2003). Thus the anticipation of shame
affects behavior. But, relatively little has been written about how the emotion of shame, rather
than its anticipation, generates behavior and affects decisions (Elster 1998).
In the modern day there are attempts to harness shame to improve behavior, whether of
polluting ﬁrms or of criminals (Braithwaite 1989). In developing countries such as Indonesia the
Proper Prokasih program seeks to reduce future pollution by having the polluters suffer a “Day
of Shame.” Such ﬁrms play a repeated game. In contrast, deserters who never returned to ﬁght
could do nothing to atone for their past actions. Such one-shot games are not limited to the Civil
War. They have been played by men who compromised themselves in fascist, communist, or
other dictatorial regimes. They have also been played by men who fought in unpopular wars.
We leave for future researchers to study whether returning Vietnam War soldiers, men who were
publicly denigrated as “baby-killers,” would be more likely to move to a pro-war community.
Voting Appendix
Even solidly Republican counties in 1860 became McClellan counties in 1864, particularly once
the Emancipation Proclamation turned the Civil War into a war against slavery (e.g. see the case
study by Reardon (2002)). Economic interest played a role as well. In the east north central
region the Civil War severed western-Southern trade along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers
and local banks, with their holdings of Southern bonds, collapsed, further aggravating existing
tensions between Midwestern farmers and the Northeast over protective tariffs and high freight
rates (Klement 1999: 43-52). Confederate agents dreamed of an uprising leading to a western
Confederacy (Waugh 1997: 210). In addition, because the Republican party was associated with
24the anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic Know-Nothings, McClellan received the immigrant vote
(Klement 1999: 93). Our regression analysis of county characterstics on McClellan’s share of
the vote (see Appendix Table 1) bears this out, but also emphasizes that slave-holding counties
were more pro-McClellan and that religious divisions, even controlling for ethnic composition,
played a largerole. When we dividedreligions intopietist (Methodist, Baptist, Congregationalist,
Presbyterian, and Unitarian), a group containing many abolitionists who viewed the war as God’s
wrath over the curse of slavery (Fogel 1989), liturgical (Catholic, Lutheran, and Episcopalian),
and other we found that the pro-McClellan counties were much less likely to be pietist relative
to other and much more likely to be liturgical relative to other. In addition, counties where
McClellan received a high proportion of the vote were poorer, had a lower percentage of their
labor force in manufacturing, and had larger foreign-born populations, particularly Irish and
German. Even controlling for all of these observable characteristics we found that counties in the
Middle Atlanticand inthe East NorthCentralregions were muchmorelikelyto be pro-McClellan
relative to New England whereas counties in the West North Central region were even more anti-
McClellan. ComparedtothecoalitionvotingforDouglasinthe 1860presidentialelection(results
not shown), the coalition voting for McClellan was even more divided on religious lines.
Data Appendix
Our sample is drawn from a dataset of 35,570 white, enlisted men in 303 Union Army infantry
companies, representing roughly 1.3 percent of all whites mustered into the Union Army and 8
percent of all regiments that comprised the Union Army.19 The primary data source consists of
19The data were collected by Robert Fogel and are available from http://www.cpe.uchicago.edu. The 303 com-
panies are part of a sample of 331 companies, picked at random with one hundred percent sampling of all of the
enlisted men. Our sample is limited to 303 companies because complete data have not yet been collected on all 331
companies. Amongtheoriginal331companies, NewEnglandisunder-representedandtheMidwestover-represented
25men’s military service records. These records provide such basic information as year of muster,
age, birthplace, and height in inches, and also informationon what happened to the soldier during
his military service such as death, injury, illness, desertion, arrest, or AWOL. These 35,570 men
were linked to the manuscript schedules of the 1860 census which provides information on the
value of personal property for all individuals in the household and on illiteracy and allows us to
infer marital status.
Sample Construction
We take the sample of 35,570 men and restrict it to men who survived the war, men not known
to have died before 1880, men with information on date of discharge, desertion, or other events
that led them to leave the company (necessary for distinguishing between returned deserters and
deserters), and men with consistent and non-missing information on such basic characteristics as
birth place and age at enlistment or birth year. This leaves us with a sample of 20,301 men, 36
percent of whom (7,224) we can link to the 1880 census. (We later further restrict the sample to
men with identiﬁable county information in 1860.) Our linkage procedure used a combination
of computerized and manual procedures. We obtained computerized lists of potential census
matches based upon a last name matching the soundex and a match of the ﬁrst letter of either the
ﬁrst or middle name from the Center for Population Economics at the University of Chicago and
restricted the lists to those whose age in 1880 was within ten years of the expected age of our
veterans, to those who were born in the same state or foreigncountry, and to white males. If, after
our restrictions, the list of potential matches was still greater than 40 we classiﬁed these men as
not found and did not search any furtherfor them. If the list of potential matches was less than 40
relative to the army as a whole. The companies that have not yet been collected are from Indiana and Wisconsin,
states that were very committed to the Union cause.
26trained genealogists decided whether a name was a potential match. The genealogists classiﬁed
all matches as 1) good, 2) possible, 3) possible plus, and 4) not found. A “good” match was one
where there existed only a single match to a given name and surname. A “possible” match was
one where either a) there were two or three possible matches to a given name and surname but
only one match was within 2 years of the expected age of the veteran in 1880; b) there was a
match to the surname, but the given name, while not exact, was a possible alternative name; or, c)
there was match to the surname but instead of the given name, only the proper initial was listed.
A “possible plus” match was one where the matched name ﬁt the criteria for a possible match but
because the name was signiﬁcantly unusual or because of some other special consideration the
possibility of a match was deemed better than possible but short of good. A “not found” match
was one where either none of the choices was an acceptable match or when there were several
possible matches, all equally good. Among the men who were found, 65 pecent of them were
“good” matches, 30 percent of them were “possible” matches, and the remaining 5 percent were
“possible plus” matches.
We were able to test the quality of our matches by comparing our matching with that
done by the Center for Population Economics at the University of Chicago to the 1880 census
using information from the pension records (and therefore excluding deserters). We found that
among men who were both in their and in our linked dataset we had the same match in 97 percent
of all cases and a different match in the remaining 3 percent of cases. Because our linkage
procedure was based upon limited information, we could not ﬁnd 33 percent of the men in the
linked Center for Population Economics data.
The sample of 20,301 men whom we tried to link to the 1880 census was slightly richer
than the original sample of 35,570 men who served in the Union Army. Median total household
personal property wealth in 1860 was $150 dollars and controlling for age and region a median
regression in which the logarithm of total household property wealth was the dependent variable
27revealed that total household personal property wealth was lower by a statistically signiﬁcant
$16 in our sample of 20,315. However, total household real estate wealth was the same in both
samples.
Our sample of 7,224 men linked to the 1880 census differs from our initial sample
in several ways. A probit regression of the ﬁnding probability showed that the foreign born,
particularly the Irish, were less likely to be found. Laborers were less likely to be found than
farmers, professionals or proprietors, or artisans. Those who lived in households with higher
total personal property wealth in 1860 were more likely to be found. Census enumerators may
have been less meticulous in accurately recording the names, places of birth, and ages of the poor
and foreign-born and in enumerating them and the foreign-born and the poor may have given
census enumerators less accurate information. In addition, if mortality rates were higher among
the foreign-born and the poor, we would be less likely to ﬁnd them. To our surprise, men who
enlisted in counties with higher percentages of the foreign-bornand of workers in manufacturing
and with a large city of at least 50,000 people in the county were less likely to be found. We
suspect that in such counties either individuals or census enumerators in 1880 were less careful
or that we are measuring an urban mortality penalty.
Variables
Dependent Variables
Our empirical work uses several dependent variables. We examine migration using a dummy
variable equal to one if the veteran moved across states between 1860 and 1880 and a dummy
variable equal to one if he moved at least 350km (as measured at the county centroid) between
those years. We investigate the determinants of our ﬁnding a veteran in the 1880 census using a
dummy equal to one if we ﬁndthe veteran. We examine what state a veteran moves to conditional
on his being a mover using an indicator variable for all 48 mainland states.
28Socio-economic and Demographic Characteristics
1. Occupation. Dummy variables indicating whether at enlistment the recruit reported his
occupation as farmer, artisan, professional or proprietor, or laborer. Farmers’ sons who
were not yet farmers in their own right would generally report themselves as farmers.
2. BirthplaceDummyvariables indicatingwhether atenlistment the recruitreportedhis birth
place as the US, Germany, Ireland, Great Britain, Canada, or other.
3. Age at enlistment. Age at ﬁrst enlistment.
4. Married in 1860. This variable is inferred from family member order and age in the 1860
census. This variable was set equal to 0 if the recruit was not linked to the 1860 census.
5. Log(total household personal property) in 1860. This variable is the sum of personal
property wealth of everyone in the recruits’ 1860 household. This variable is set equal to 0
is the recruit was not linked to the 1860 census.
6. Missing census information. A dummy equal to one if the recruit was not linked to the
1860 census. Linkage rates from the military service records to the 1860 census were 57
percent. The main characteristic that predicted linkage failure was foreign birth.
7. Illiterate. This variable is from the 1860 census and provides illiteracy information only
for those age 20 and older.
8. Missing illiteracy information. A dummy equal to one if we do not know whether the
recruits was illiterate, either because he was not linked to the 1860 census or because he
was less than age 20 in 1860.
9. Year of muster. Dummy variables indicating the year that the soldier was ﬁrst mustered
in.
10. Volunteer. A dummy equal to one if the recruit was a volunteer instead of a draftee or a
substitute.
11. Bounty. We create a dummy variable equal to one if a recruit received a bounty upon
enlistment and a dummy variable equal to one if a recruit was owed a bounty upon his
return. Bounties for enlistment were offered by Congressional districts after mid-1862
when counties had difﬁculty meeting their recruiting quotas.
12. Uncommon name. A dummy equal to one if the soldier had an uncommon surname,
that is one that appears less than four times in the 1880 integrated public use census
sample, http://www.ipums.umn.edu. We thank the Center for Population Economics at the
University of Chicago for this variable.
29City, County, and State Characteristics
1. Populationincity ofenlistment. We obtainedpopulation incity of enlistment fromUnion
Army Recruits in White Regiments in the United States, 1861-1865 (ICPSR 9425), Robert
W. Fogel, Stanley L. Engerman, Clayne Pope, and Larry Wimmer, Principal Investigators.
Cities that could not be identiﬁed were assumed to be cities of population less than 2,500.
2. Percent of vote for McClellan in the 1864 Presidential election. We obtained by county
of enlistment the percent of the vote for McClellan from Electoral Data for Counties in the
United States: Presidential and Congressional Races, 1840-1972 (ICPSR 8611), Jerome
M. Clubb, William H. Flanigan, and Nancy H. Zingale, Principal Investigators. If voting
information is unavailable for a county, then for counties in the Confederacy we attributed
a 90 percent share of the vote to McClellan and for other counties we attributed a 0 percent
of the vote to McClellan. We therefore also include a dummy variable indicating that in
these two cases the share of the vote for McClellan is unknown. We use our county data to
obtain state-wide voting percentage for McClellan, weighted by the total number of votes
cast in each county.
3. County Characteristics We obtain information on the share of the population that was
foreign born, on the share of the population in manufacturing, and on average personal
property and land wealth from Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data:
The United States, 1790-1970 (ICPSR 3), Inter-University Consortium for Political and
Social Research, Principal Investigator. We obtain information on county birth place and
occupational fragmentation, on county birth place composition, and on whether a county
contained a city whose population was at least 50,000 from the 1860 integrated public use
census sample, http://www.ipums.umn.edu.
4. State ﬁxed effects. We include state ﬁxed effects in our regressions.
5. Other state characteristics. For every state the soldier could potentially move to, we
estimate its distance from his home state in miles and in latitude minutes, calculated from
the state centroid.
Company Characteristics
We use company characteristics and ideology as instrumental variables for whether an individual
was a deserter. The company characteristics (estimatedforthe full sample of35,570 men)that we
use are birth place fragmentation (calculated for the categories New England, Middle Atlantic,
East North Central, West North Central, Broder, South, West, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Great
Britain, Scandinavia, northwestern Europe, other European, and other foreign); occupational
fragmentation (calculated for the categories farmer, higher class professionals and proprietors,
lowerclass professionalandproprietors,artisans, upperworkingclass laborer,lowerclass laborer,
30and unknown); the coefﬁcient of variation in age at enlistment; the percent of the company
that died; the percent of the company that died from illness; the percent of the company that
died within 6 month intervals; dummy indicators for battles (First Battle of Bull Run, Shiloh,
Second Battle of Bull Run, Antietam, Fredricksburg, Chancellorville, Vicksburg, Gettysburg,
Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Seven Days, Cold Harbor, Wilnderness, Spotsylvania, Stone River,
Atlanta, Kennesaw Mountain, Petersburg, and the March to the Sea); the percent voting for
Lincoln in 1860 in the soldier’s county of enlistment; the occupational composition of the
company (percentprofessional or proprietor,artisan, laborer, and farmeras the omitted category);
and the Gini coefﬁcient for total household personal property wealth in 1860. When the Gini
coefﬁcient was unavailable (because too few soldiers in the company were linked to the 1860
census), the Gini coefﬁcient was set equal to 0 and a dummy variable indicating that the Gini
coefﬁcient was missing was used in the regression.
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33Table 1: CharacteristicsofNon-Deserters, ReturnedDeserters, and DesertersintheInitialSample
and in the Found Sample
Initial Sample Found Sample
Non- Returned Non- Returned
Deserters Deserters Deserters Deserters Deserters Deserters
Percent of sample 0.872 0.033 0.095 0.917 0.028 0.055
Dummy=1 if born in
United States 0.679 0.680 0.430 0.764 0.759 0.638
Ireland 0.088 0.121 0.209 0.028 0.049 0.087
Britain 0.038 0.049 0.084 0.033 0.038 0.064
Germany 0.088 0.075 0.099 0.069 0.082 0.098
Canada 0.034 0.036 0.074 0.031 0.049 0.067
Other foreign country 0.073 0.039 0.104 0.075 0.023 0.046
Dummy=1 if occupation at enlistment
Farmer 0.491 0.381 0.247 0.555 0.497 0.335
Professional or proprietor 0.082 0.085 0.097 0.075 0.066 0.103
Artisan 0.209 0.282 0.257 0.204 0.251 0.249
Laborer 0.210 0.249 0.392 0.157 0.186 0.310
Unknown 0.008 0.003 0.007 0.009 0.000 0.003
Dummy=1 if volunteer 0.894 0.892 0.788 0.916 0.896 0.852
Dummy=1 if received bounty 0.311 0.289 0.249 0.315 0.273 0.249
Dummy=1 if owed bounty 0.178 0.157 0.182 0.176 0.115 0.190
Household personal property wealth ($) 581 384 429 635 442 365
Dummy=1 if married in 1860 0.306 0.366 0.388 0.296 0.333 0.291
Dummy=1 if illiterate 0.034 0.063 0.070 0.032 0.053 0.035
Dummy=1 if enlisted in
1861 0.205 0.298 0.127 0.196 0.300 0.132
1862 0.324 0.384 0.299 0.350 0.393 0.321
1863 0.060 0.067 0.170 0.047 0.066 0.148
1864 0.262 0.148 0.217 0.264 0.164 0.215
1865 0.149 0.103 0.187 0.143 0.077 0.184
Dummy=1 if uncommon name 0.472 0.434 0.391 0.539 0.574 0.461
1860 Population in city of enlistment 76,286 147,160 127,669 49,611 103,375 100,549
Percentage of county vote for McClellan 45.76 49.68 49.35 44.44 48.16 48.11





Non-deserter 0.440 0.331 0.229
Returned deserter 0.422 0.353 0.225
Deserter 0.636 0.242 0.122
The columns give the fraction ofnon-deserters, returned deserters, and deserters who moved across states, who moved
withinstate but across county, and who remained withinthe same county between enlistment and 1880.
Table 3: Fraction of State and Long Distance Movers by Desertion Status and Percentage of
Home County Voting for McClellan
McClellan’s Percent of Vote
> 60% 40-60% < 40%
Fraction of State Movers
Non-deserter 0.524 0.410 0.466
Returned deserter 0.500 0.395 0.519
Deserter 0.575 0.618 0.676
Fraction Moving at least 350km
Non-deserter 0.372 0.303 0.364
Returned deserter 0.375 0.322 0.357
Deserter 0.375 0.471 0.492
Home county is county of enlistment.
35Table 4: Differences in the Fraction of State and Long Distance Movers by Desertion Status and






























































































































































































































F is the fraction of state movers or of movers who moved at least 350km, D indicates deserter, RD indicates returned
deserter, ND indicates non-deserter, HI indicates that more than 60 percent of voters in the home county voted for
McClellan, MED indicates that between 40 and 60 percent of voters in the home county voted for McClellan, and HI
indicates that more than 60 percent of voters in the home county voted for McClellan. Estimated from Table 3.




















Returned deserter -0.016 -0.017 0.006 0.007






(0.034) (0.118) (0.037) (0.149)
Log(% county vote for McClellan) 0.004 -0.003 -0.000 -0.023
(0.018) (0.027) (0.017) (0.028)
Deserter






￿ for test of joint signiﬁcance of Deserter
and Deserter
 Log(%county vote for McClellan) 27.88 30.13
Prob >
 2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.075 0.075 0.075
Coefﬁcients are the mean derivatives from a probit regression in which the dependent variable is equal to one if the
soldiermoved betweenstates oratleast 350kmand0otherwise. Additionalcontrolvariables includeage at enlistment,
dummyvariablesforplace ofbirth(US,Ireland,Britain,Germany, Canada, andother),dummyvariablesforoccupation
at enlistment (farmer, professional or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown), a dummy equal to one if the soldier
volunteered, a dummy equal to one if the soldier received a bounty at enlistment, a dummy equal to one if the soldier
was owed a bounty upon his return, the logarithm of personal property wealth in 1860, a dummy equal to one if the
soldier was illiterate, a dummy equal to one if the soldier was married in 1860, the logarithm of population in the
city of enlistment, dummies equal to one if information on county voting was missing, if information on literacy was
missing, and if thesoldier was notlinkedto the 1860census, dummies foryear ofenlistment, and dummies forstate of




z indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
37Table 6: Effect of Deserter Status on the Probabilityof State and Long Distance Moves, Compar-
ison of Probit and IV Probit Results
State Mover
 350km Mover
(1) (2) (1) (2)
IV IV IV IV































(0.024) (0.125) (0.121) (0.023) (0.214) (0.178)







(0.024) (0.117) (0.117) (0.023) (0.214) (0.188)
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.071 0.076 0.074 0.075 0.074
Deserters include returned deserters. Probit estimates are the mean derivatives from a probit regression in which the
dependent variable is equal to one if the soldier moved between states or moved at least 350km and 0 otherwise.
Additional control variables include the percentage of the county voting for McClellan in 1864, age at enlistment,
dummyvariablesforplace ofbirth(US,Ireland,Britain,Germany, Canada, andother),dummyvariablesforoccupation
at enlistment (farmer, professional or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown), a dummy equal to one if the soldier
volunteered, a dummy equal to one if the soldier received a bounty at enlistment, a dummy equal to one if the soldier
was owed a bounty upon his return, the logarithm of personal property wealth in 1860, a dummy equal to one if the
soldier was illiterate, a dummy equal to one if the soldier was married in 1860, the logarithm of population in the
city of enlistment, dummies equal to one if information on county voting was missing, if information on literacy was
missing, and if the soldier was not linked to the 1860 census, dummies for year of enlistment, and dummies for state
of enlistment. Countycharacteristics are the share ofthe laborforce inmanufacturing, mean personalpropertywealth,
mean land value, the coefﬁcient of variation in age, birth place fragmentation, occupational fragmentation, and birth
place composition. Instrumental variables for (1) are the percent of the company that died, the percent that died of
disease, the percent dying within a 6 month period, and dummy variables indicating battles. Instrumental variables
for (2) also include the percent voting for Lincoln in the 1860 election in the soldier’s county of enlistment and the
followingcompany characteristics: birthplace fragmentation, occupational fragmentation, the coefﬁcient of variation
in age, indicators of the occupational composition of the company, and the Gini coefﬁcient for 1860 total household




z indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.






















Log(% county for McClellan) -0.012 -0.011 -0.006
(0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
Deserter
 Log(% county vote for McClellan) -0.010 0.013
(0.017) (0.031)
Regression includes 1860 county characteristics N N Y
 2
￿2
￿ for test of joint signiﬁcance of Deserter
and Deserter*Log(%county vote for McClellan) 58.60 61.52
Prob >
 2 0.000 (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.064 0.064
Coefﬁcients are the mean derivatives from a probit regression in which the dependent variable is equal to one if the
soldierwas foundinthe 1880census. Additionalcontrolvariables includea dummy indicatingwhether thesoldierhad
an uncommon name, age at enlistment, dummy variables for place of birth (US, Ireland, Britain, Germany, Canada,
and other), dummy variables for occupation at enlistment (farmer, professional or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and
unknown), a dummy equal to one if the soldier volunteered, a dummy equal to one if the soldier received a bounty at
enlistment, a dummy equal to one if the soldierwas owed a bountyupon his return, the logarithmof personal property
wealth in 1860, a dummy equal to one if the soldier was illiterate, a dummy equal to one if the soldier was married
in 1860, the logarithm of population in the city of enlistment, dummies equal to one if information on county voting
was missing, if informationon literacy was missing, and if the soldier was not linked to the 1860 census, dummies for
year of enlistment, and dummies for state of enlistment. County characteristics in 1860 are a dummy equal to one if
the county contained a city whose population was at least 50,000, the logarithm of the share of the county labor force
in manufacturing, and the logarithm of the percent foreign-born. Robust standard errors clustered on the county are
in parentheses. 18,274 observations. The symbols
 ,
y, and
z indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,
respectively.





















Returned deserter -0.016 -0.017 0.006 0.006






(0.037) (0.054) (0.047) (0.141)
Log(% county vote for McClellan) 0.005 0.009 0.000 0.004
(0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
Deserter






￿ for test of joint signiﬁcance of Deserter
and Deserter








(0.129) (0.128) (0.133) (0.137)
Log pseudo-likelihood -15254.46 -15250.34 -14835.71 -14834.17
Coefﬁcients are the mean derivatives of the probability of a move conditional on being observed from a selection
corrected probitregression in which the dependent variable in the main regression is equal to one if the soldier moved
between states or moved at least 350km and 0 otherwise and the dependent variable in the selection regression is equal
tooneifthesoldierwasfoundinthe1880census and0otherwise. The selectionregresssionincludesa dummyvariable
equal to one if the soldier had an uncommon name. Additional control variables in all four regressions include age at
enlistment, dummy variables for place of birth (US, Ireland, Britain, Germany, Canada, and other), dummy variables
for occupation at enlistment (farmer, professional or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown), a dummy equal to one
if the soldier volunteered, a dummy equal to one if the soldier received a bounty at enlistment, a dummy equal to one
if the soldier was owed a bountyupon his return, the logarithmof personal propertywealth in 1860, a dummy equal to
one if the soldier was illiterate, a dummy equal to one if the soldier was married in 1860, the logarithm of population
in the city of enlistment, dummies equal to one if informationon countyvotingwas missing, if informationon literacy
was missing, and if the soldier was not linked to the 1860 census, dummies for year of enlistment, and dummies for
state of enlistment. Robust standard errors clustered on the county are in parentheses. 18,274 observations and 6,479
observationsinwhichmover statusisobserved. The symbols
 ,
y, and
z indicatesigniﬁcanceat the10, 5,and 1percent
level, respectively.
40Table 9: Determinants of State Migrant Locational Choice
Coef- Odds Coef- Odds
icient Ratio icient Ratio
Log(% of state voting for McClellan) 0.002 1.002 -0.014 0.987
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)





(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)





(absolute value ) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
(Returned deserter)
 Log(%of state voting for McCellan) 0.163 1.178
(0.103) (0.103)
(Returned deserter)
 Distance 0.023 1.023
(0.022) (0.022)
(Returned deserter)
 (Latitude difference) -0.055 0.946
(0.063) (0.063)
Deserter
















￿ for test of joint signiﬁcance of
of all interactions 16.82 4.36
Prob >
 2 0.001 0.225
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.088
Coefﬁcients and odds ratio are from a conditional logit model. Characteristics are the characteristics of the potential
location (state). The soldier decides which state to move to based upon its characteristics, conditional on being a
state mover. Each observation,
s
i
j, is person i’s potential choice of state j. Robust standard errors, clustered on
the individual, are in parentheses. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation uses non-deserters and returned deserters as the omitted
category. 152,563 observations. The second speciﬁcation excludes returned deserters and the omitted category is
non-deserters. The regression also includes a dummy if information on the share voting for McClellan was missing.
141,330 observations. The symbols
 ,
y, and
  indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.





Occupation at Enlistment Farmer or Proprietor Artisan Laborer Obs. ND vs RD vs
Farmer
Non-deserter (ND) 57.32 11.64 10.61 20.43 3,573
Returned deserter (RD) 54.29 14.29 5.7 25.71 105 4.488
Deserter (D) 59.68 8.87 8.87 22.58 124 1.526 2.753
Professional or proprietor
Non-deserter (ND) 18.01 43.64 17.58 20.76 472
Returned deserter (RD) 7.14 35.71 42.86 14.29 14 6.123
Deserter (D) 8.57 25.71 40.00 25.71 35 13.076 0.977
Artisan
Non-deserter (ND) 19.49 12.94 46.77 20.81 1,283
Returned deserter (RD) 10.20 12.24 51.02 26.53 49 3.058
Deserter (D) 22.73 14.77 38.64 23.86 88 2.194 4.061
Laborer
Non-deserter (ND) 26.06 13.85 18.17 41.92 1,040
Returned deserter (RD) 14.63 17.07 24.39 43.90 41 3.168
Deserter (D) 20.17 14.29 20.17 45.38 119 2.003 0.927
The table lists percentage of non-deserters, returned deserters, and deserters who were in an 1880 occupational
category, conditionalon occupationat enlistment. 6,943 observations(observationsinclude those withoutinformation
on county at enlistment).
 2 tests are for the difference in the occupational distribution of non-deserters (ND) and
returned deserters, non-deserters and deserters, and returned deserters (RD) and deserters, conditional on occupation
at enlistment. The onlytwo occupationaldistributionsthatare signiﬁcantlydifferent at at least the 10 percent level are
those for non-deserters and deserters conditionalon being a professional or proprietorat enlistment.
42Appendix Table 1: Determinants of Vote for McClellan in 1864
Coeﬁ- Std Odds
cient Err Ratio






% of labor force in manufacturing -0.700
z 0.269 0.497
Dummy=1 if county above county mean for
Personal property wealth -0.024 0.040 0.976
Real estate wealth -0.082
y 0.039 0.921
% of free population slave-owners 0.159
z 0.025 1.172
















East North Central 0.304
z 0.074 1.355
West North Central -0.199
z 0.097 0.820
Border 0.115 0.133 1.122



















Presidential and Congressional Races, 1840-1972 (ICPSR 8611), Jerome M. Clubb, William H. Flanigan, and Nancy
H. Zingale, Principal Investigators. Our county characteristics are from Historical, Demographic, Economic, and
SocialData: The UnitedStates, 1790-1970(ICPSR 3), Inter-UniversityConsortiumfor Politicaland Social Research,
Principal Investigator, with the exception of the percent born in a particular birthplace which we estimated from the




at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.













Move  Stay  Move  Stay  Move  Stay 
Pick Location Pick Location Pick Location
Observe FoundFigure 2: Migration Distance Cumulative Distibution Function by Deserter Status
Note: Migration distance is measured between enlistment and 1880 county centroids.
45